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ADMIRALTY-JuRIsDIcrIoN-NoN-MARITIME TORTS-IN REM ACTioN IN STATE
COURT FOR INJURY TO OBJECT ON SHORs-While employed as a stevedore by the
defendant vessel and while working on the wharf, the plaintiff was injured by a
sling-load of cement that was being lowered from the ship. He brought a tort
action in the state court against the vessel by name, in accordance with the Oregon
"Boat Lien Law." Or. Laws, I920, sec. io28i et seq. It was objected that the
state court had no jurisdiction in an action in rem against a foreign vessel. Held,
that ihe court had jurisdiction. Cordrey v. The Bee (1921, Or.) 201 Pac. 202.
The power of the federal courts is limited to that granted by the Constitution,
in which it is provided, that "The judicial Power shall extend . . . . to all Cases
of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction." Art. 3, sec. 2. It is well established
that, in contract matters, admiralty jurisdiction depends upon the nature of the
transaction, and in tort matters, upon the locality. Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v.
Rhode (1922) 42 Sup. Ct I57; see p. 561, infra. In the instant case, therefore,
admiralty could have no jurisdiction over the tort as such. Keator v. Rock Plaster
Mfg. Co. (igig, S. D. N. Y.) 256 Fed. 574; The Bee (914, D. Or.) 216 Fed.
7o9. But a stevedore performs a maritime service, giving the plaintiff a contract
claim in admiralty, a point which the two preceding cases seem to have overlooked.
Atlantic Transport Co. v. lInBrovek (1914) 234 U. S. 52, 34 Sup. Ct 733. The
claim, however, is limited to maintenance and cure, and an indmnity only if the
injury were caused by a defective appliance; and it cannot be enlarged by state
laws. Chelentis v. Luckenbach (1918) 247 U. S. 372, 38 Sup. Ct 5o. Work-
men's Compensation statutes create contract rights and are not available.
So. Pacific Co. v. Jensen (917) 244 U. S. 205, 37 Sup. Ct. 524; see COMMENTS
(917) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 255; (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 925. And
where this is the sole remedy of the employee under the state law, a stevedore
injured on shore has no claim in tort Keator v. Rock Plaster Mfg. Co. (I918)
224 N. Y. 540, 12o N. E. 56; certiorari denied in State Industrial Commission v.
Rock Plaster Mfg. Co. (i918) 248 U. S. 574, 39 Sup. Ct. 12. Although the claim
is within the admiralty jurisdiction, a state court may maintain an action
in personam with an attachment of the ship as security. "Knapp, Stout & Co. v.
McCaffrey (i9oo) 177 U. S. 638, 20 Sup. Ct. 824. But it cannot maintain an
action in rem if admiralty has jurisdiction. The Glide (1897) 167 U. S. 6o6, 17
Sup. Ct. 930. And the Oregon statute is void in so far as it authorizes the Oregon
courts to do so. Aurora Shipping Co. v. Boyce (igii, C. C. A. 9th) I91 Fed. 96o.
But this necessarily cannot apply when the cause of action is not cognizable in
admiralty. See Johnson v. Chicago & P. Elevator Co. (1886) 119 U. S. 388, 397,
7 Sup. Ct 254, 258. And even an action in rem in the state court should be
permitted. See Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, supra, at p. 647, 20 Sup. Ct at
p. 828. Until Congress has legislated, the state may protect its citizens, the inci-
dental interference with commerce being immaterial. Pennsylvania Ry. v. Hughes
(903) 191 U. S. 477, 488, 24 Sup. Ct 132, 135; see COMMENTS (1921) 30 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 732. In the instant case, however, there are two possible viewpoints.
The plaintiff's claim in contract and his claim in tort may be considered as wholly
distinct and separate, so that the admiralty jurisdiction in contract does not prevent
a state from having jurisdiction in remn over the tort. But it seems more in line
with the federal policy of uniformity in the maritime law to consider the tort and
contract claims as differing remedies arising from the same cause, which is thus
within the admiralty jurisdiction.
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BILLS AND NOTEs-ALTERATION OF PAYEE'S NAME ON DRAFr BEFORE CERTIFICA-
TION-INABILITY OF DRAWEE TO RECOVER PAYMENT MADE TO HOLDER.-The plain-
tiff bank certified a draft and paid its amount to the defendant bank, a holder in
due course. The plaintiff later discovered that the draft had been stolen and
altered, by changing the name of the payee, before it had been presented to the
plaintiff for certification. The plaintiff sued to recover from the defendant. Held,
that the plaintiff could not recover. National City Bank v. National Bank of the
Republic (1921) 300 Ill. 103, i32 N. E. 832.
Prior to the Negotiable Instruments Law it was settled that an acceptor
warranted the genuineness of the drawer's signature but not the other parts of a
bill. Hence when the signature of the drawer was genuine but the amount of the
bill was altered before it was accepted, the acceptor could recover from the holder
of the bill. White v. Continental Nat. Bank (1876) 64 N. Y. 316. Section 62 of
the N. I. L. provides that an acceptor of an instrument "engages that he will pay
according to the tenor of his acceptance; and admits .... the existence of the
payee and his then capacitr to indorse." This section has been interpreted to
mean that the acceptor "must pay to the innocent payee or subsequent holder the
amount called for by the bill at the time he accepted, even though larger than the
original amount ordered by the drawer." And that "a fortiori a drawee who pays
a raised bill or check, without acceptance or certification, should not recover the
money paid from an innocent holder." Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law
(1900) 14 HARv. L. REv. 241, 243. It would seem from the wording of the
N. I. L. and Dean Ames' interpretation, which has never been challenged, that a
change was intended in the common law. But if so, the courts certainly have not
recognized it Continental Nat. Bank v. Tradesnan's Nat. Bank (1899) 36 App.
Div. 112, 55 N. Y. Supp. 545; New York Produce Exchange Bank v. Twelfth
Ward Bank (i909, Sup. Ct.) 62 Misc. 69, iig N. Y. Supp. 988; McClendon v.
Bank of Advance (1915) 188 Mo. App. 417, 174 S. W. 203; Interstate Trust Co. v.
United States Nat. Bank (i919) 67 Colo. 6, i85 Pac. 26o. The theory on which
these cases rest is that the acceptor paid the money by mistake and that the holder
warranted the genuineness of every part of the bill except the signature of the
drawer. To require the acceptor to warrant the tenor of the bill as it was when
presented to him would seriously retard business. It is impossible for him to
determine from the face of the instrument whether it has been altered. He would
require a personal confirmation by the drawer of the tenor of every draft. It is
the holder, who has trusted the fraudulent person, that should bear the loss. It
is unreasonable for him to have acted in reliance on the acceptance. Further, it
may very well be that the N. I. L. was intended to mean that the acceptor engages
to pay only according to the original tenor of the instrument and admits the exis-
tence of the original payee only. The instant case, however, follows Dean Ames'
interpretation, thereby establishing a new conflict on the N. I. L. In view of the
fact that the purpose of the N. I. L. was primarily to codify and unify the existing
law, it is submitted that the decision is wrong and anomalous. It may be of some
comfort to the supporters of Dean Ames that his conclusion is at least in line with
the law of England and the Continental countries. Langton v. Lazarus (1839,
Exch.) 5 M. & W. 628; I Pardessus, Cours de Droit Conmercial (6th ed. i856)
545.
CoNFLIcT OF LAwS-DvoRcE DECREE OBTAINED IN FOREIGN STATE THROUGH
FRAUD--PRosEcuTIoN FOR BIGAm.-The accused and his wife were domiciled in
Virginia, where they separated. He later obtained a divorce, without personal
service or appearance of his wife, in West Virginia, testifying that his wife had
abandoned him and that more than one year had elapsed since the separation.
The accused then married a second wife and returned to Virginia, where he was
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convicted of bigamy. Held, that the West Virginia divorce decree would not be
recognized, the conviction for bigamy being sustained. Coriin v. Commonwealth
(1921, Va.) io8 S. E. 651.
Where one spouse has obtained a domicil in a state other than that of the rightful
matrimonial domicil, and has obtained a divorce without personal service or
appearance of the other spouse, the court of the matrimonial domicil need not
recognize the divorce under the full faith and credit clause of the federal consti-
tution. Haddock v. Haddock (i9O6) 201 U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct. 525; but see
Goodrich, Matrinwnial Domicil (1917) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 49. The courts,
however, are disposed to recognize the decree on the grounds of comity, but there
is authority to the contrary. Joyner v. Joyner (i9o8) 131 Ga. 217, 62 S. E. 182;
Duncan v. Duncan (1920) 265 Pa. 464, lO9 AUt. 220. If the spouse who obtained
the divorce had induced the court to take jurisdiction by fraudulent representa-
tions, the decree will not be recognized in another state because of the lack of
jurisdiction of the court granting the divorce. Wagoner v. Wagoner (1921, Mo.)
229 S. W. lo64; but see Hicks v. Hicks (1912) 69 Wash. 627, 125 Pac. 945. In
the instant case, however, the fraud was not such as affect the jurisdiction of the
court, and it would be an anomaly to permit a decree to be attacked collaterally
for perjury in the trial itself. From statements in some cases it seems as though
this exception may be created in divorce cases, although the point has never been
squarely decided. See Succession of Benton (igoi) io6 La. 494, 31 So. 123; 59
L. R. A. 135, 186, note; but see Deyette v. Deyette (1918) 92 Vt. 305, 1o4 Atl.
232 (suit brought by third party). Since the courts are therefore not required
to recognize a decree of divorce based on service by publication, they may specify
under what conditions they will recognize it. It seems, however, that only strong
reasons of public policy should induce a court to refuse to give effect to a decree,
as in the instant case, on the grounds of perjury at the trial.
CoNTRAcrs-ImposslBItnTY OF PERFORMANCE BY THE PLAINTIFF OF A CONDITION
PRECEDENT TO THE DUTY OF THE DEFENDANT.-The plaintiff was employed by the
township trustee to teach in the county school for a six-month term. The health
board, acting under statutory authority, ordered the trustee to close the school in
view of an influenza epidemic. Burns Ann. Sts. 1914, sec. 7608. The plaintiff
sued the trustee for payment for the period during which she had not been able to
teach. Held, that the trustee was under no duty to pay. Gregg School v. Hinshaw
(1921, Ind.) 132 N. E. 586.
The recent tendency in similar cases has been to evade the real problem by
finding either that the defendant has waived the condition of performance by the
plaintiff, or that the defendant has impliedly ordered the teacher to hold himself
in readiness to perform during the period of suspension, and thus not only waived
the original condition but received a substituted performance of equal value.
Board of Education v. Couch (1917) 63 Okla. 65, 162 Pac. 485; Montgomery v.
Board of Education (1921, Ohio) 131 N. E. 497. Such a solution, however, is
unsatisfactory, since, in the majority of cases, there is no foreknowledge of the
duration of the closing, and such a request may always be implied from the mere
form of the notice. See Montgomery v. Board, supra. And even those cases
which imply the request from the temporary nature of the closing, seem to hold,
somewhat inconsistently, that if at any time afterward, the closing becomes perma-
nent, such a request will not be inferred. Randolph v. Sanders (1899) 22 Tex.
Civ. App. 331, 54 S. W. 621; Board v. Couch, supra. Other courts hold that the
performance of the teaching service, the condition precedent to the duty of the
defendant to pay, has been made impossible, apparently by the defendant's act in
closing the school, and that such prevention by the defendant nullifies the condi-
tion. Dewey v. School District (188o) 43 Mich. 480; School District v. Gardner
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(192o) 142 Ark. 557, 219 S. W. II; Crane v. School District (1920) 950r. 644,
188 Pac. 712. It seems strange, however, that courts have not taken the necessary
step further and recognized that the same things which excuse the plaintiff from
the performance of his duty, should excuse the defendant 'when he makes it
impossible for the plaintiff to perform a condition precedent to the defendant's
duty. For example, if the influenza epidemic had reached such proportions that
the teacher's life would be endangered if he continued to teach, there is little doubt
that he would be excused from his promised performance, and that the defendant
would be excused from payment, since the latter had not received the expected
consideration. Lakenman v. Pollard (857) 43 Me. 463. Thus if the plaintiff's
promised performance was the attendance of babies at a baby show, if the preva-
lence of an epidemic made such attendance dangerous to the lives of the babies,
the plaintiff would be excused from performance and the defendant from payment.
Hanford v. Conn. Fair (i918) 92 Conn. 621, 103 AtI. 838. If the plaintiff has
the privilege to refuse performance if his or a third person's life is endangered,
and thereby can destroy the defendant's rights under the contract as well as his
own, there seems to be no reason why the defendant under the same circumstances
should not have the privilege to keep the plaintiff from performing the condition
precedent to the defendant's duty, and thereby destroy the plaintiff's rights under
the contract, as well as his own. Tested by this reasoning, even without such
statutory sanction as in the principal case, the defendant should be excused.
Sandry v. Brooklyn School District (1921, N. D.) 182 N. W. 689; 3 Williston,
Contracts (ig2o) sec. 1958.
COPYRIGHT-COMMoN-LAW COPYRIGHT-PRoDucER's RIGHTS IN CREATION.-The
defendant, composer of the "Wicked Blues," sold all his rights therein to the
plaintiff. Subsequently the defendant with others copyrighted the song as the
"Crazy Blues" and published it. The plaintiff sought an injunction. Held, that
the defendant by his sale to the plaintiff parted with his common-law rights in the
production and that an injunction should issue. Kortlander v. Bradford (1921,
Sup. Ct.) 116 Misc. 664, i9o N. Y. Supp. 311.
Until publication a producer has at common law full property rights in his
intellectual creations. Parton v. Prang (1872, C. C. D. Mass.) 3 Cliff. 537;
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus (19o6, C. C. A. 2d) 147 Fed. i5; Morgan, Law of
Literature (1875) 392. What constitutes a publication is often difficult to deter-
mine. "A publication consists in such a disclosure, exhibition, or distribution as
implies an abandonment of the right of copyright or its dedication to the
public..... .. The nature of the subject-matter . . . . and the nature of the
rights secured, are chiefly determinative of the question of publication." Werck-
ineister v. Amierican Lithographic Co. (904, C. C. A: 2d) 134 Fed. 321, 326. It
was originally held that even after publication or dedication to the public the
exclusive right to the control of reproduction remained with the producer, his
representatives, or assigns. Millar v. Taylor (1769, K. B.) 4 Burr. 23o3. But it
is now everywhere well-settled that a producer's common-law rights in an unpub-
lished work cease upon publication. Donaldsons v. Beckett (1774, H. L.) 4 Burr.
2408; Wheaton v. Peters (834, U. S.) 8 Pet. 59i. See Drone, Copyright (1879)
13. The right to the control of reproduction after publication is now purely
statutory. Caliga v. Inter Ocean Newspaper Co. (1909) 215 U. S. 182, 30 Sup. Ct
38. Having full property rights prior to publication, an author can deal with his
production as with any other personalty. Maurel v. Smnith .(192i, C. C. A. 2d)
271 Fed. 211. He may dispose of the physical object solely and retain the right to
make copies or to obtain a copyright. Parton v. Prang, sapra; Stephens v. Cady
(1852, U. S.) 14 How. 528. He may otherwise make a restricted disposal of it as
by selling the right to reproduce in certain countries only. Daly v. Walrath
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(1899) 40 App. Div. 220, 57 N. Y. Supp. 1125. In the present case, the producer
before publication, by an unrestricted disposal, chose to divest himself of all rights
in his production. Consequently a subsequent assignee, whether taking with or
without notice, could not interfere with the first assignee's right to the exclusive
use of the property. See Harms v. Stern (1915, C. C. A. 2d) 229 Fed. 42.
DAMAGEs-BREACH OF CONTRACT-REmoTENESS OF Loss.-The defendant's agent,
upon receipt of $5o2.44 from the plaintiff's agent, promised to telegraph the sum
of $5oo to Baltimore and there pay that amount to such person as the defendant
believed to be the plaintiff without requiring positive evidence of identity, the
plaintiff's agent at the time of sending the message signing a waiver of identifi-
cation. The defendant refused to deliver to the plaintiff at Baltimore without
positive identification, whereby the plaintiff, because unable to deposit promptly
$5oo for certain horses which he had purchased and resold, lost $7,5oo. Held,
that the plaintiff could recover only nominal damages. Taggart v. W. U. Tel. Co.
(1921) I98 App. Div. 366, I90 N. Y. Supp. 450.
If loss of profits resulting from a breach of contract can be measured with
reasonable certainty, and if such loss results not too remotely from the breach,
damages therefor may be recovered. N~elson v. Davenport (1gig) io8 Wash.
259, 183 Pac. 132; Tompkins v. Bridgeport (192o) 94 Conn. 659, 11o At. 183.
If a promisor actually knows the kind of benefits his promisee reasonably expects
from performance of the contract, and if the benefits anticipated are not inher-
ently speculative, then the loss of those benefits as a result of the promisor's
breach is usually held not remote. Czizek v. W. U. Tel. Co. (1921, C. C. A. 9th)
272 Fed. 223; Miles v. Am. Ry. Exp. Co. (1921, Ark.) 233 S. W. 930; W. U.
Tel. Co. v. Johnson (1921, Tex.) 226 S. W. 671; Shurtleff v. Occidental Bldg. &
Loan Assoc. (1921, Neb.) 181 N. W. 374. Conversely, if the benefits are not within
the reasonable contemplation of the promisor, the promisee upon breach cannot
recover damages for their loss. Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch. 341;
Hines v. Denny (1921) 19o Ky. 416, 227 S. W. 567. And, as the instant case
holds, this is true even though the amount of the loss can be measured with
certainty. A statement in the body of a telegram, if reasonably clear to the
telegraph company, may put the company upon such notice of the kind of benefits
expected by the sender, as to justify his recovery of damages arising from their
loss in case of failure to transmit and deliver the message properly. Dettis v.
W. U. Tel. Co. (1919) 141 Minn. 361, 17o N. W. 334. But here, too, if the
anticipated benefits are not measurable with reasonable certainty there can be no
recovery for their loss. Harris v. W. U. Tel. Co. (1918) 136 Ark. 63, 206 S. W.
52. The instant case seems in accord with the best authority.
FORCE MAJEUR-IMPOSSInwTY OF PERFORMANCE AS A DEFENE.-A statute
imposed a duty on the appellants to pay a penalty for failing to supply electricity
to applicants. In a suit by the respondent for the penalty, the appellants set up
the defence of force majeure which the statute allowed. They proved that per-
formance was prevented by the refusal of their union employees to connect their
main with respondent's wiring, which had been installed by a 'non-union con-
tractor. The trial court found a "grave probability" of a strike which would
plunge the whole community into darkness, if the recalcitrant employees were
dismissed. Held, that this apprehension of danger was not force 'najeure.
Hackney Borough Council v. Dore (1921, K. B.) 38 T. L. R. 93.
Recent English cases reveal a tendency of attorneys in drafting contracts to
secure elasticity in the clause excusing non-performance by employing the term
"force majeure." It is admirable for their purpose for as yet the courts are
reluctant to give it a definition. Although the term "force nmajeure" is of French
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orgin, little aid can be derived from the French law in the process of fixing its
meaning, for great difference of opinion exists both among the French writers
and the French courts as to its significance and application. Dalloz, Nouveau
Code Civil (19O1-5) art. 1148, sec. I et seq.; Biermann, Die Hihere Gewalt im
Franzisischen Recht (1895) Io Archiv fiir Biirgerliches Recht, 46. The same
uncertainty exists in the continental law respecting the term vis major. Loren-
zen, Moratory Legislation (1919) 28 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 38o (Appendix C.
Vis Major). Doubtless, however, the eventual meaning of force majeure will
include "Act of God." The Boucau [19o9] P. 163; see (1922) 31 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 44o. With reference to other causes the result is indeed problematical
and will be reached slowly by a process of exclusion and inclusion, at present
greatly influenced by the possibility of the defendant foreseeing the impediment to
his future performance. Thus delay due to cessation of work on account of
normal bad weather, a football game, or a funeral, or due to a deviation of a ship
running short of coal, is not caused by force mnajeure. Matsoukis v. Priestman
& Co. [1915) I K. B. 68i; Yrazu v. Astral Shipping Co. (19o4, K. B.) 9 Com.
Cas. ioo. Nor is a default resulting from a defect in tin used in canning by the
defendant's vendor. Iibeaupin v. Crispin [1920] 2 K. B. 714. But non-perform-
ance on the day designated arising from the indirect effect of a general coal strike
and from the breaking down of machinery was excused under the doctrine.
Matsoukis v. Priestinan & Co., supra. Perhaps war is force majeure. See
Zinc Corporation v. Hirsch [1916, C. A.] I K. 3. 541, 554. In the instant case
the court reluctantly refused to construe a threatening strike as force majeure
excusing the non-performance of a statutory duty. If an actual strike had been
called, an opposite conclusion would have been probable. Murphy Hardware Co.
v. So. Ry. (19o9) 15o N. C. 7o3, 64 S. E. 873. So elastic is the term that it would
seem to have been better social engineering for the English court to have weighed
the grave likelihood of detriment to the whole community with the respondent's
inconvenience and to have allowed the appellants to have protected the many to
the neglect of the one.
HOMESTEAD--JOINDER OF HUSBAND AND WIFE IN DEED OF MORTGAE-ESTOPPEL
OF HUSBAND To DENY VALIDITY OF DEED.-The plaintiff, fraudulently represent-
ing himself to be unmarried, gave to the defendant a mortgage deed to his home-
stead-which he knew to be invalid, fully aware that the defendant accepted it in
good faith. This action was brought by the husband and wife to set aside the
mortgage as void. The wife died after the commencement of the action, the
ownership of the property remaining unchanged. Held, that the plaintiff was
estopped to deny the validity of the mortgage. Bozich v. First State Bank of
Buhl (I92I, Minn.) 184 N. W. IO2I.
A deed purporting to convey land to which the "grantor" has no title is invalid.
If title subsequently vests in the grantor, he is estopped to deny its validity.
Coke, Littleton,* 47b; 2 Tiffany, Real Property (192o ed.) sec. 545. Similarly,
in cases involving homestead rights, the husband may have title to the land, but
he has not the sole power of conveyance. When this power subsequently vests
in him, he should be estopped to deny the validity of his former deed (as an
exercise of such power). The general rule is that a deed or mortgage purporting
to convey a homestead, executed by a married man, is inoperative unless his wifejoins in the conveyance. Robison v. Robison (igig) 187 Iowa, 1209, 175 N. W.
9; Ferrell v. Wood (1921, Ark.) 232 S. W. 577. Although the homestead rights,
which are given by statute only, may be lost by abandonment, it has been held
that a mortgage deed executed by one spouse only and therefore invalid will not
be validated by a subsequent abandonment. Shanwon v. Potter (1921, Okla.)
2oo Pac. 86o. If either spouse joins the other in signing a deed under duress or
RECENT CASE NOTES
while mentally unbalanced, it is invalid even when the grantee purchases without
knowledge of these facts. Hayden v. Latch (i921, Iowa) 182 N. W. 868. So
also the husband is not estopped when his lessee knew that the wife was insane.
Peterson v. Skidmore (i921, Kan.) 195 Pac. 6oo. However, if a new homestead
is acquired, the husband is estopped to deny the validity of a deed executed by
him alone on the former homestead. Fisher v. Gulf Protection Co. (i92I, Tex.
Civ. App.) 231 S. W. 450. Upon examination it will be found that the cases
which seem to hold that the deed, being invalid, cannot operate as an estoppel
against either the husband or the wife, are in fact based upon the ground that
there was no proof of fraud exercised upon the grantee, rather than upon the
alleged rule that "neither husband nor wife can be estopped from asserting the
homestead right as against a grant or mortgage not executed in the mode pre-
scribed by law." 13 R. C. L. 663; i5 Cyc. 686; see Clark v. Bird (1909) 158 Ala.
278, 48 So. 359; Gillam v. Wright (igio) 246 Ill. 398 92 N. E. 906; Ekblaw v.
Nelson (914) 124 Minn. 335, 144 N. W. io94. (In regard to an action for breach
of contract to convey a homestead, see 4 A. L. R. 1272, note.) It can hardly be
questioned that an estoppel could not have been set up against the joint interest
of the husband if the wife had remained alive. In view of his fraudulent mani-
festations, however, the court seems to have reached a very just result.
INSURANCE'-ExPRESS WARRANTY AS TO HEALTH-GOD FAITH OF APPLICANT.-
In an action upon a life insurance policy wherein the insured expressly warranted
the truth of the statements set out in the application, questions as to whether the
insured had consulted a doctor within five years or had ever had pleurisy were
incorrectly answered in the negative. Held, that as the facts did not show that
the insured knew or should have known the nature of his affliction when
examined, the warranty was not broken and the beneficiary could recover.
Cothran, J., dissenting. Sligh v. Soverign Camp (ig2i, S. C.) 109 S. E. 279.
By the great weight of authority, the incorrectness in fact of warranties as to
bodily health will entirely avoid the policy, the good faith of the applicant being
immaterial. National Annuity Association v. McCall (1912) io3 Ark. 201, 146
S. W. 125; Layton v. New York Life Ins. Co. (i92I, Calif. App.) 202 Pac. 958;
15 L. R. A. (x. s.) 1277, note. The decision in the instant case, however, may
be noted as an extreme example of a tendency of some courts to avoid so strict
an interpretation of "express warranty clauses" and to adopt the view that the
applicant warrants only the honesty and good faith of his opinion as to his bodily
condition. This is more just to the policy-holder who can otherwise never be
sure-of the validity of his contract. Moulor v. American Life Ins. Co. (884)
III U. S. 335,4 Sup. Ct. 466; see Rasicot v. Royal Neighbors of Alnerica (igio)
I8 Idaho, 85, 98, io8 Pac. io48, 1052. In many states it has been necessary to resort
to legislation to avoid the orthodox construction of warranty clauses. Such stat-
utes practically abolish the effect of warranties as to health. See 2 Cooley,
Briefs on Insurance (i9o5) pars. n89-rI95. They are constitutional. Hancock
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Warren (i9oI) I8 U. S. 73, 21 Sup. Ct. 535. One statute
has gone so far as to provide that the issuance of a certificate of health by the
appointed medical examiner estops the insurer from asserting that the applicant
was not in the state of health required by the policy. Iowa Ann. Code, 1897, sec.
I8r2. It is difficult to perceive how the instant court could have construed a
warranty that the insured had not consulted a doctor within five years to have
been made in good faith, when the evidence showed a hospital operation within
such time. See I8 L. R. A. (N. s.) 362, note. Moreover, both of these contested
warranties were obviously material to the contract. A construction reducing the
effect of an immaterial warranty to that of a representation should be met with
approval, but where the warranty is both mhterial and false, there can be no
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equity in charging an insurer who has been so induced to assume the risk. See
Blenke v. Citizen's Life Ins. Co. (1911) 145 Ky. 332, 342, 140 S. W. 561, 565.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE-STATE CONTROL OF ANIMALS FERAE NATURAE.-The
Alabama Shrimp Act made it unlawful to transport by water shrimp, taken from
the waters of the state, beyond the state boundary, unless the usual price paid at
the place to which they were transported was higher than that paid within the
state; imposed a tax on shrimp so transported; and prohibited any person, who
had not for more than a year been a bona fide resident of the state, from catch-
ing shrimp for shipment out of the state by water. Gen. Acts, 1919, secs. 8, 12.
The plaintiff, who was engaged in the shrimp packing business in Mississippi,
brought suit to enjoin the enforcement of this act. Held, that these regulations
were void as in violation of the commerce clause of the United States Constitu-
tion. Elmer v. Wallace (1921, N. D. Ala.) 275 Fed. 86.
Shrimp, with fish in general, may properly be classified as animals ferae
naturae. Gratz v. McKee (1919, C. C. A. 8th) 258 Fed. 335; State v: Adams
(1920) 142 Ark. 411, 218 S. W. 845. In so far as there can be property in fish in
streams, title is in the state with an exclusive power of control. State v.
Blanchard (1920) 96 Or. 79, 189 Pac. 421; Gratz v. McKee (192o, C. C. A. 8th)
270 Fed. 713; State v. Hume (19o) 52 Or. I, 95 Pac. 8o8; Commonwealth v,.
Cosick (191o) i Pa. Dist. R. 309. Even migratory fish in interstate navigable
streams or in coast waters are subject to exclusive state regulation while within
the state boundaries. Gould, Waters (3d ed. igoo) par. 38; State v. McCullagh
(1915) 96 Kan. 786, 153 Pac. 557. Although the fish, after being caught, are to
be transported beyond state limits, Congress may not, under the guise of interstate
commerce, regulate the catching of them. Geer v. Connecticut (1895) 161 U. S.
519, 16 Sup. Ct. 6oo. Such legislation is within the proper police power of the
state, although it results in harm to the fishing industry in neighboring states.
Union Packing Co. v. Shoemaker (1921) 98 Or. 659, 194 Pac. 854. Nor is this
power of control terminated by the capture and reduction to possession of an
animal ferae naturae. The state may follow wild game into the hands of an
individual so as to prohibit its coming under federal interstate commerce regula-
tion. United States v. McCullagh (1915, D. C. Kan.) 221 Fed. 288. It is to be
noticed in all of these cases, where statutes similar to the instant act have been
upheld, that their primary purpose was to preserve wild game for the benefit of
the citizens of the state. But when the statute has no protective purposes, either
as to animals or citizens, and is designed to discriminate against the industries
of neighboring states by preventing shipments out of the state except on arbitrary
conditions as to price, etc., the police power seems to have been abused at the
expense of federal control over interstate commerce. Cf. State v. Savage (igig)
96 Or. 53, 184 Pac. 567.
MANDAMUS-WHEN ISs'uABLE-DlscRETiox OF CITY CouNclL.-Under New
York statutes a bus owner is required to obtain the consent of the local authorities
as well as that of the State Public Service Commission before he is privileged
to operate. Laws, 1915, ch. 667; 1919, ch. 307. The city council of Newburgh,
after a hearing, denied such consent to the relator upon the grounds that his bus
line was not a public necessity or for the best interest of the city, whereupon an
a ction was brought to compel the city council by mandamus to grant such consent.
Held, that the writ should be granted. People, ex rel. Aber, v. Leonard (1921,
N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 116 Misc. 591.
That city councils are amenable to the writ of mandamus as are others upon
whom public duties are imposed is unquestionable. State v. Mayor and Council
of Madison (1919) 170 Wis. 133, 174 N. W. 471; Harman v. City of Parsons
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(1917) 81 W. Va. 197, 94 S. E. 135; Huey v. Waldrop (1904) 141 Ala. 318, 37
So. 380. But it is well settled that the mandamus is not a proper remedy for the
enforcement of duties which involve the exercise of discretion or to control
such discretion, unless it has been abused. Cruise & Smiley Co. v. Town Coun-
cil of Lincoln (1920) 42 R. I. 408, io8 Atl. 419; McIntyre v. Murphy (1919) 177
N. C. 300, 98 S. E. 820; People v. State Racing Corn. (19o7) 19o N. Y. 31, 82
N. E. 723. The writ has been issued to set the exercise of discretion in motion.
State v. Board of Corers. (1913) i8o Ala. 489, 61 So. 368; Richmotnd County v.
Steed (1920) 15o Ga. 229, lO3 S. E. 253. When, however, the discretion has been
honestly and not capriciously or arbitrarily exercised, it is conclusive. Robinson
v. Otis (1916) 3o Calif. App. 769, 159 Pac. 441; Pearl River Bank v. Town of
Picayune (1921, Miss.) 89 So. 9. The granting of licenses for the conduct of
particular businesses or occupations is usually regarded as a discretionary power
and thus not enforceable by mandamus. High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies
(3d ed. 1896) ch. 5, sec. 327; Armstrong v. Murphy (igol) 65 App. Div. 123, 72
N. Y. Supp. 473. But its issuance may be made mandatory by statute. State v.
City of Grafton (1920, W. Va) 1O4 S. E. 487; In re O'Rourke (1894, Sup. Ct.)
9 Misc. 564, 30 N. Y. Supp. 375. The courts are agreed that the complainant's
legal right must be clear to entitle him to the writ of mandamus. 2 Spelling.
Injunctions and Extraordinary Remedies (2d ed. 19Ol) ch. 4o, sec. 1370; People
v. Board of Education (I921, Sup. Ct.) 188 N. Y. Supp. 686; People v. Walker
(1920, Sup. Ct.) 113 Misc. 592, 184 N. Y. Supp. 879. In the instant case it is by
no means clear that the city was under any duty to give its consent to the relator's
operation of his bus line. It is equally doubtful whether the legislature intended
to restrict the powers of regulation and control delegated to local authorities to
the limits the opinion suggests. See COMMENTS (1921) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
183. The case seems unsustainable.
NEGLIGENCE-DEGREES OF NEGUGENE.-In an action for damages for injuries
sustained as a result of the alleged negligent and wanton acts of the defendant,
the latter pleaded contributory negligence as a defence. The trial court in
instructing the jury failed to distinguish between negligence (whether slight,
ordinary, or gross) and wanton acts involving the element of the defendant's
knowledge of the plaintiff's danger and a conscious indifference to the conse-
quences of his acts. Held, that'the instruction was erroneous. Payne v. Vaince
(1921, Ohio) 133 N. E. 85.
In the earlier cases, the courts attempted to divide negligence into three degrees,
slight, ordinary, and gross. Brand v. Schenectady & Troy Ry. (185o, N. Y.)
8 Barb. 368; Union Pacific Ry. v. Henry (1887) 36 Kans. 565, 14 Pac. i. Where
negligence without reference to the degree is the basis of the right to recover,
such distinctions can only be a source of confusion. As has well been said, "gross"
negligence is nothing more than negligence with a vituperative epithet. Wilson
v. Brett (1843, Exch.) II M. & W. 113, 116. The modern American cases have
shown a strong tendency to reject the doctrine that negligence is capable of
division into degrees, and hold in effect that although the amount of care to be
exercised varies with the circumstances, the degree remains the same, namely,
appropriate care under the circumstances. Milwaukee etc. Ry. v. Arms (1875)
91 U. S. 489; Young v. St. Louis etc. Ry. (91o) 227 MO. 307, 127 S. W. 19;
Denny v. Chicago etc. Ry. (1911) IO Iowa, 460, I3O N. W. 363. It is essential,
however, to distinguish negligence from reckless or wanton conduct, for in cases
involving the latter, contributory negligence is no defence and punitive damages
may be awarded. Crosman v. Southern Pac. Co. (1921, Nev.) 194 Pac. 839;
Pullman Co. v. Pulliam (1920) 187 Ky. 213, 218 S. W. 1005. One is guilty of
reckless or wanton conduct if he exhibits an entire absence of care for life,
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person, or property of others and displays an indifference to disastrous conse-
quences. Lund v. Osborne (1917) 2oo Ill. App. 457. Statutes, by using the term
"gross negligence," have made it incumbent upon some courts to define its mean-
ing. In Massachusetts it is held that it means a materially greater want of care
than in case of ordinary negligence but yet less than the willful, wanton, or
reckless conduct which makes a defendant liable to a trespasser. Massaletti v.
Fitzroy (1917) a28 Mass. 487, i18 N. E. 168. In absence of statute, however, the
amount of negligence is important only in cases of wanton or ,reckless conduct.
The court in the instant case, in repudiating the doctrine of the divisibility of
negligence into degrees, is in accord with the modern tendency.
NEGLiGENcE-RCOVERY FOR DE:AT OF CHu CAUSED BY EATING POISONOUS
BERRIES IN A PUBLIC P.RK.-The plaintiff's child, a boy of seven, died from
eating a few berries which he picked from a shrub growing in a part of the
public Botanic Gardens of Glasgow, in which he and other children were accus-
tomed to play. Although highly poisonous the berries were luscious and alluring
in appearance, bearing great similarity to currants. The plaintiff sued the
defendant city for negligence. Held, that a'cause of action was disclosed and
the case should have been allowed to go to the jury. Glasgow Corporation v.
Taylor (1921, H. L.) 38 T. L. R. 102.
As a result of loose and inaccurate application of the expression "attractive
nuisance" much obscurity has been cast upon the duties of landowners in respect
to children. The question presented is whether an infant, even though a tres-
passer, is entitled to have the place into which it may stray and the things it
finds there made so safe, with reference to its own incapacity to take care of
itself, as to render it immune from injury. If a categorical answer to any
question of law were possible, in England it would be, no. The owner of land
owes no duty to make premises safe for a trespasser, whether infant or adult,
and in the absence of the concurrence of a license and either negligence or some
element of fraud, there could be no recovery by a child for injuries received.
Hardy v. Central London Ry. [1920] 3 K. B. 459; Latharn v. R. Johnson &
Nephew, Ltd. [1913] I K. B. 398; Cooke v. Midland Great Western Ry. [1909,
H. L.] A. C. 229. In the United States the authorities are in an almost hopeless
state of inconsistency. A few jurisdictions have adhered strictly to the ortho-
dox rule as to the duty to trespassers and have refused to extend the doctrine
beyond the so-called "turn-table" situation. Blough v. Chicago Great Western
Ry. (I9g2o, Iowa) 179 N. W. 84o; see (1921) 20 M cH. L. REv. 45o. Other juris-
dictions have seized upon the doctrine with avidity and have applied it to almost
every conceivable state of facts. Comer v. City of Winston-Salem (1919, N. C.)
1O0 S. E. 619 (child crawling between bridge railing to see rushing waters);
N. Y. N. H. & H. Ry. v. Feuchter (i92I, C. C. A. 2d.) 271 Fed. 419 (where a
boy received a shock who climbed the topmost girder of a bridge and reached
for a pigeon resting on a live wire), criticised in (1921) 3o YALE LAW JOURNAL,
870. It is readily apparent that many courts have allowed their sympathy for
the infant plaintiff to affect their judgment. The conclusion reached in some
of the cases is untenable. It is practically impossible to render premises "child-
proof" and yet the courts in effect impose that burden upon the landowner.
The Lords in the instant case base their decision flatly on the ground of negli-
gence by the defendants in view of all the circumstances. The poisonous berries
were exposed to the children who were privileged to be where they were, and
the age of the child precluded negligence on his part. See (1921) 31 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 102; Bohlen, The Duty of a Landlord to Those Entering his Premises
(1921) 69 U. PA. L. REv. 237, 340.
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SALES-IMPLIED WAR ANTY-FITNESS FOR RESALE UNDER LAW OF FOREIGN
CouNTRY.-The plaintiff, an Argentine firm, purchased a quantity of medicinal
waters from the defendant, an English manufacturer, who had been supplying
the plaintiffs with these waters for a number of years. The Argentine authori-
ties analyzed some of the waters of the last purchase, and ordered them to be
destroyed because they were found to contain salicylic acid and were not legally
salable in Argentina. The plaintiff instituted suit for damages for breach of
warranty alleged to be implied by section 14 of the English Sale of Goods Act.
(1893) 56 & 57 Vict. c 71, sec. 14. Held, that there was no implied warranty
that the waters were suitable for sale in Argentina, and that the words "mer-
chantable quality" in the English statute had no reference to the state of law
of the country to which the goods were to be sent Sumner, Permain & Co.
Ltd. v. J. G. Webb & Co. Ltd. (1921, C. A.) 38 T. L. R. 45.
Caveat emptor governed the sale of goods at early common law, and in the
absence of an express warranty, the vendor was not liable for any defects in the
article sold unless he was aware of them. Rolle, Abridgkment, p. 90, pl. I, 2, 3,
4. However, it is now well established that under certain circumstances a seller
impliedly warrants the merchantability of the articles sold, and if their intended
use is communicated to him there is an implied warranty that the goods are
reasonably suited for that use. Jones v. Just (1868) L. R. 3 Q. B. 197; Brown
v. Edgington (1841, C. P.) 2 Man. & G. 279; Murchie v. Cornell (i8gi) 155
Mass. 60, 29 N. E. 207. It must appear that the buyer relied on the judgment
and skill of the seller in the selection of the article before any warranty of fit-
ness can be implied. Kellogg Bridge Co. v. Hamilton (1884) 1o U. S. io8, 3
Sup. Ct. 537. This rule has been incorporated in both the English Sale of Goods
Act, section. 14, and in the American Uniform Sales Act, section i5. Apparently
the burden is on the buyer, who alleges the warranty, to prove that he relied on
the seller's superior knowledge. It is possible in certain cases that describing
the goods as being of merchantable quality is equivalent to saying that they are
fit for the use intended. See Williston, Sales (i9o9) sec. 235. This would be
the situation in the instant case if the contentions of the plaintiff were upheld;
if the tonic waters were not fit for resale in Argentina they were not of "mer-
chantable quality." It seems that this term has been used solely to describe the
physical state of the goods sold, i. e. that they are sound commodities, and are
not damaged or in a state of decay such as would prevent them from being
readily salable. See Benjamin, Sales (192o) 6th ed. 730; 2 Mechem, Sales
(i9oi) sec. 1340. It is conceivable, however, that an English manufacturer could
be held to have impliedly warranted his products to be legally salable under the
law of England, but this warranty could hardly be implied with reference to
the law of a foreign country of which the manufacturer has no knowledge.
Cf. National Metal Edge Box Co. v. Gotham (i9o8) 125 App. Div. 1or, IO9
N. Y. Supp. 450. In the absence of any proof that the plaintiff relied on the
superior knowledge and judgment of the defendant the court seems fully justi-
fied in having decided in the latter's favor.
TAXATION-INTANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY OF RESIDENT SITUATED IN ANOTHER
STATE AND BEQUEATHED TO NON-REsIDENT.-A resident of Colorado died in New
York, leaving personal property consisting of stocks, bonds, and credits, all of
which were in New York. The legatees were residents of New York and the
will was probated in that state. The State of Colorado brought suit in a New
York court against the executrix and legatees to recover an inheritance tax.
Held, that the action could not be maintained. State of Colorado v. Harbeck
(1921, N. Y.) 133 N. E. 357-
Intangible personal property, although outside the state where the decedent
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was a resident, may be subjected to an inheritance tax under the application of
the maxim "inobilia sequuntur personam." Bullen v. Wisconsin (1915) 240 U. S.
625, 36 Sup. Ct 473; Frothingham v. Shaw (1899) 175 Mass. 59, 55 N. E.
623. Cf. Anderson v. Durr (1921, U. S.) 42 Sup. Ct. 15; COMMENTS (1922) 31
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 429.- And vice versa, where the property has a situs within
the state, an inheritance tax may be imposed irrespective of where the decedent
or the beneficiary may reside. Blackstone v. Miller (1903) 188 U. S. 189, 23
Sup. Ct. 277; Carr v. Edwards (1913) 84 N. J. L. 667, 87 Atl. 132. On this
latter principle, shares of stock in a domestic corporation may be subjected to
a transfer tax although the decedent and beneficiary are non-residents, and the
certificates of stock are outside the state. Greves v. Shaw (1899) 173 Mass. 205,
53 N. E. 372; People v. Griffith (1910) 245 Ill. 532, 92 N. E. 313. It has been
held in Illinois, however, that shares of stock in a foreign corporation are not
subject to such a tax although the corporation owned property within the state,
the conditions being otherwise similar. Oakinan v. Small (918) 282 Ill. 36o,
118 N. E. 775. The real reason for this doctrine is probably the practical objec-
tion to efiforcing such a tax by taking the corporate property. See Gleason &
Otis, Inheritance Taxation (2d. ed. 1gig) 321. The reason given by the court,
however, was the familiar principle that the taxing power of a state is limited
to persons or property within its jurisdiction, which seems inapplicable to the
facts of the case since there was property of the corporation in the state, of
which the share-holders are of course the owners. But in the instant case an
even greater practical difficulty existed, in that there was actually no property
in Colorado and hence no way to collect the tax by a proceeding in that
state, the beneficiaries being also beyond the jurisdiction. Penwyer v. Neff
(1877) 95 U. S. 714. The New York Court, furthermore, was clearly right in
'dismissing the suit brought by the State of Colorado against the executrix and
beneficiaries in New York, since the penal and revenue laws of one state have
no force in another. Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Company (i888) 127 U. S.
265, 8 Sup. Ct. 137o. The present case does not decide whether the tax failed
because there was no taxing power or because there was no means of collecting
it. It has been held that a state has no constitutional power to impose a trans-
fer tax merely because the beneficiary lives within the state, if the decedent is
a non-resident and the property is also outside the state. State v. Brim (1858)
57 N. C. 3oo. This is clearly sound if the tax is upon the privilege of trans-
mitting rather than upon the privilege of receiving. See (1920) 30 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 199; but cf. Carter's Estate (1918) 167 Wis. 89, 166 N. W. 657 (evenly
divided court) ; see also People v. Griffith, supra. So far as the power to tax
is involved it appears therefore that the residence of the decedent and not that
of the beneficiary is important. (But cf. Oakinan v. Small, supra, in which the
court said that either the beneficiary or the property must be within the juris-
diction.) Hence if the beneficiaries, though resident in New York, could be
served with process in Colorado the present tax might be collected. In other
words the tax failed for lack of "jurisdiction in personam" rather than for
lack of "jurisdiction of the subject matter." People v. Union Trust Co. (1912)
255 Ill. 68, 99 N. E. 377; Re Hodges (915) 17o Calif. 492, 150 Pac. 344; Re
Dingin.an (19O1) 66 App. Div. 228, 72 N. Y. Supp. 694. The State of Colorado
thus imposed a legitimate tax, for the collection of which, however, under the
peculiar circumstances, no adequate machinery can be devised.
TORTS-CONVERSION-DEFENDANT LIABLE FOR A MISDELIvERy RESULTING IN
Loss.-The defendants agreed to buy a certain bond from the plaintiff. By
mistake the plaintiffs sent a different bond, which their messenger dropped
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through a slot maintained in the defendant's office for the receipt of securities.
The defendants immediately discovered the error and, in endeavoring to return
the bond to the plaintiff's messenger, handed it out through the window to a
stranger, thinking that he was the plaintiff's messenger. The stranger having
disappeared with the bond, the plaintiff sued the defendants for conversion.
Held, that the plaintiff could recover. Lehman, J., dissenting. Cohen v. Press-
prick (1922, N. Y. Sup. Ct. App. T.) 66 N. Y. L. JouR. 98 (Jan. 30, 1922).
Conversion being a tort of absolute liability, the responsibility of the defendant
is not affected by the fact that he acted in good faith or exercised due care.
Pollock, Torts (iith ed. 1920) 381; Bowers, Conversion (1917) sec. 4. An
innocent mistake is no defence. White v. Yawkey (1896) io8 Ala. 27o, i So.
36o; 'Edwards v. Express Co. (1903) 121 Iowa, 744, 96 N. W. 740. It is suffi-
cient if the defendant does an act which deprives another of his property per-
manently or for an indefinite period of time. Knapp v. Guyer (9o9) 75 N. H.
397, 74 AtI. 873; Hiort v. Bott (1874) L. R. 9 Exch. 86; Salmond, Torts (5th
ed. 1920) 348. A carrier who, through mistake, misdelivers goods is liable for
conversion. Youl v. Harbottle [1791, N. P.] I Peake, 49; Furman v. Union
Pacific Ry. (1887) io6 N. Y. 579, 13 N. E. 587. The problem presented in the
principal case is difficult because the court is called upon to decide which of two
innocent persons must suffer. While it appears from the conclusion of the
majority opinion that the court was not fully convinced by their own argument,
it is believed that the decision is sound. There seems to be no difference in
principle between the instant case and the Hiort and Knapp cases, supra. In
each of them, the loss was due to the defendant's innocent delivery of the plain-
tiff's goods to a person who was unauthorized to receive them. It is said that
"Any one who finding himself in possession of goods hands them over to another
takes on himself the risk that such person may have no right to receive them."
Clerk & Lindsell, Torts (7th ed. 1921) 238. If this is acceptable as a correct
statement of the law, clearly the defendants must bear the loss. It may be
doubtful whether they had possession of the bond as soon as it was dropped
through the slot provided for the receipt of such papers, but they certainly
assumed to control it for an instant before handing it to the stranger.
TRUSTS-VARYING INVESTMENTS AGAINST ExPREss DIRECTION.-The testator,
owner of a business for the cooperage of whiskey barrels, devised the entire
estate to his wife as trustee during her life or widowhood, to carry on the busi-
ness so "that the family will continue to live as nearly as during my life as
possible." Because of national prohibition the business became unprofitable.
Held, that the trustee could, with permission of the court, convert the trust
property into other investments in order to carry out the purpose of the trust.
Stout v. Stout (1921, Ky.) 233 S. W. 1057.
Generally the courts adhere to the rule that a trust instrument is the sole
source of all the powers of a trustee. Drake v. Crane (1895) 127 Mo. 85, 29
S. W. 99o; Worcester City Missionary Soc. v. Memorial Church (19o4) 186 Mass.
531, 72 N. E. 71. So when specific designation is made by the testator for the
investment of the trust estate, it is generally held that the trustee is bound by
the directions. Merchants Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Trust Co. (911) 250
Ill. 86, 95 N. E. 59; Matter of London (1918, Surro.) 104 Misc. 372, 171
N. Y. Supp. 981; I Perry, Trusts (6th ed. 1911) sec. 452. A court of equity
can make no new will for the testator. Drake v. Crane, supra. However, excep-
tions to this ancient rule were early recognized. Thus when circumstances arose
necessitating acts not literally within the terms of the trust, equity, by construct-
ing what it presumed would have been the testator's intent, gave additional
powers to the trustee. Revel v. Watkinson (1748, Ch.) I Ves. Sen. 93 (mainte-
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nance, where otherwise unprovided for, allowed out of corpus); Packard v.
Illinois Trust & Savings Bank (1914) 261 Ill. 450, IO4 N. E. 275. A clear depart-
ure from directions was made in the case of a devise of personalty to be enjoyed
by persons in succession, where, if the property was wasting or of a perishable
nature, it became the duty of the trustee, with the approval of the court, to
convert the property into permanent securities. Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth
(18o2, Ch.) 7 Ves. Jr. 137. It is well settled that the trustee may vary the
investment or terminate the trust in the teeth of the testator's expressed intent,
with the consent of all the cestuis when they are of full age and sound mind.
Dodge v. Dodge (1914) 112 Me. 291, 92 At. 49; see White v. Sherman (1897)
168 Ill. 589, 48 N. E. 128. The primary object of the trust is to preserve the
fund and to secure a proper income therefrom, or, in other words, the purpose
of the trust overrides the directions of the testator for the investment. Ogden
v. Allen (1917) 225 Mass. 595, 114 N. E. 862; Johns v. Montgomery (1914) 265
Ill. 21, io6 N. E. 497. Specific directions are given to guarantee the success of
the trust. The testator cannot foresee every circumstance which would threaten
his purpose, and specific directions should not be made a fetish where their
object can only be accomplished by the assistance of equity in authorizing an
express departure from the trust instrument. A differentiation is thus made
between the end and the means. Matter of London, supra; In re Head (1919)
88 L. J. Ch. 236 (statute authorizing investment in war loan "notwithstanding
anything in instrument creating the trust" (1917) 7 & 8 Geo. V, c. 31, sec. 35).
A trustee takes the risk of loss in departing from the express directions of a
testator without the prior authorization of equity which will be granted only
with reluctance. Vickers v. Vickers (1920) 189 Ky. 323, 225 S. W. 44. The
court, in the instant case, faced with an uncontemplated situation reached what
appears to have been the sensible result.
